American University Criminal Law Brief
Volume 6

Issue 1

Article 3

2010

Will Cameras in the Courtroom Lead to More Law and Order? A
Case for Broadcast Access to Judicial Proceedings
Shelly Rosenfeld

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/clb
Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rosenfeld, Shelly. "Will Cameras in the Courtroom Lead to More Law and Order? A Case for Broadcast
Access to Judicial Proceedings." American University Criminal Law Brief 6, no. 1 (2010): 12-22.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
American University Criminal Law Brief by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu.

ArticleinTitle
Article Title
Article
TitleLaw and
Will Cameras
the Courtroom
Lead
to More
Article
ArticleAccess
Title Article
TitleProceedings
Order?1 A Case
forTitle
Broadcast
to Judicial
BY SHELLY ROSENFELD
I. INTRODUCTION
“I can tell you the day you see a camera come into our
courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead body.”2
-Justice David H. Souter
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”3
-U.S. Const. amend. I
“If [the glove] doesn’t fit, you must acquit”4
-Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr.
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efense attorney Johnnie Cochran’s statement became a key slogan of the O.J. Simpson trial, and
its impact reached far beyond the jury box. Due
largely to public fascination, the trial transformed
from a standard criminal case to a courtroom drama. Triggered
both by the unique circumstances of the case, such as the defendant’s celebrity status and the fact
pattern of the murder, and by the
courtroom camera, which unquestionably enabled the public’s fascination, the story was made-for-T.V.
from the beginning. Ninety-five
million people watched on television as O.J. Simpson led police officers on a high-speed chase down
the Los Angeles freeways in 1994.5
After the former football player was
charged with the murder of his exwife Nicole Brown Simpson and her friend Ronald Goldman,
seventeen million people watched the second day of Simpson’s
preliminary hearing.6 For nine months, the nation tuned in every
day to watch the daytime saga that unfolded in the courtroom.7
While Simpson was ultimately acquitted, the trial proceedings
were of great importance in establishing precedent regarding
the presence of media cameras in the courtroom. After much
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debate, Judge Lance A. Ito ruled that a single television camera
could remain in his courtroom.8 Should Judge Ito have pulled
the plug instead?
This Note will address precisely the conflict with which
Judge Ito wrestled and use the lessons of his courtroom to further analyze the issue of camera access at the Supreme Court
level. The debate regarding freedom of press and access to fair
trials is more relevant than ever because of the public’s growing interest in high-profile trials, the dedication of the media in
covering them, and the proliferation of television and Internet as
sources of judicial news. This last factor is especially significant
because most members of the public can neither attend the trials in person nor take the time to read Supreme Court opinions.
People also may not have time to watch an entire trial, depending on video clips shown on television or the Internet. Granting
cameras access to the courtrooms helps the public to have a
greater understanding of the judicial system and the legal issues involved in a case.9 Furthermore, technological innovations
have made news equipment far less intrusive and thus barely
noticeable, to courtroom participants.
The judge’s main motivation in issuing an order restricting press coverage is to ensure and protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to a fair
trial. The Sixth Amendment of the
United States Constitution says,
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial . . . .”10 The
right to a “public trial” does not
mean, however, that criminal trials
must be accessible to anyone who
wants to watch from their homes. In
other words, that specific “right” is
not absolute.
The accused’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury
must be balanced with the First Amendment rights of the press
and public.11 The primary concern is that legally inadmissible
information made available by the press may contaminate the
jury pool, leading to the possibility of jurors deciding a case
based on improper evidence.12 Also, some worry that prosecutors and defense attorneys, hoping to get more attention about
their case or to rally public support, would further dramatize
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the case.13 Will a televised case turn into an episode of Law and
Order? However, if the public only watched the televised court
proceedings of celebrities or public officials and sought only
the most sensational parts of the coverage, would they not still
be learning about the crime, its potential penalties, and judicial
procedure? If cameras are banned from criminal proceedings,
are we not missing out on an opportunity to educate the public?
To address these questions, this Note will present the relevant case history regarding press coverage of the administration
of justice. It will explain how cases, such as Estes v. Texas,14
Chandler v. Florida,15 Sheppard v. Maxwell,16 Richmond Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia,17 and Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart,18 have negotiated the rough terrain between the public’s
right to know and the desire to protect the integrity of trial.
Earlier cases addressed print journalism, since television news
technology has only been widely used during the second half
of the twentieth century.19 The lessons learned from cases involving print journalism, however, inform both past and future
policies regarding broadcast press access.
In addition, this Note will provide the history of regulations involving camera access to the courts. In response to
early excessive media coverage, the American Bar Association
(A.B.A.) drafted Canon 35 in support of curtailing camera access to the courts. The Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule
53 followed suit, applying the recommendation to the federal
court system. This Note will call attention to such statutes as
California Rule 1.150 (formerly California Rule 980), which
regulates “photographing, recording, and broadcasting in [state]
court,”20 in addition to other proposed bills that would lead to
greater camera access to trials. Among these are the “Sunshine
in the Courtroom” bill (Sunshine Bill), which would allow
federal judges to permit video cameras in the courtroom,21 and
Senator Arlen Specter’s bill, which aims to get a camera into
the nation’s highest court.22 Finally, this Note will conclude that
the Supreme Court should to change its “no cameras allowed”
policy and to enable a television camera and microphone to
serve as much a part of courtroom coverage as a pen and paper.

II. A SNAPSHOT OF TELEVISION NEWS
CAMERA REGULATION
An early source of courtroom camera regulations arose as a
result of the extensive media attention during the trial of Bruno
Richard Hauptmann. Hauptmann was accused of kidnapping
and murdering the son of Charles Lindbergh, the first person
to make a transatlantic flight.23 Although the judge imposed
restrictions on film camera use in the courtroom, the trial demonstrated that the issue of courtroom cameras could no longer
be ignored.24 In 1937, the A.B.A. recommended in Canon 35 to
forbid courtroom radio broadcasting, televising, or photographCriminal Law Brief

ing, but Canon 35 was not binding on courts.25 Following the
A.B.A.’s recommendation, however, Congress enacted the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure’s Rule 53, which states, “[t]he
taking of photographs in the courtroom during the progress of
judicial proceedings . . . shall not be permitted.”26 This prohibits
all audio or visual recording of federal criminal cases, even if
the defendant requests a televised trial.27
Whether television coverage is allowed depends on the jurisdiction. In civil cases, each U.S. court of appeals can decide
whether to allow broadcasting of appellate arguments.28 In state
superior courts, judges have the power to decide on a case-bycase basis whether to allow television coverage of courtroom
proceedings.29 In the federal district courts, however, there is
a general policy of prohibiting broadcast coverage.30 Federal
appellate court judges can decide whether to televise their court
proceedings.31 In recent years, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has allowed “[television] coverage of some high-profile
appeals.”32 Then in December 2009, the Ninth Circuit took a
further step by announcing that it would “experiment with a
‘limited use’ of cameras in its trial courts.”33
In 2005, Iowa Republican Senator Chuck Grassley and
New York Democratic Senator Charles Schumer introduced the
“Sunshine in the Courtroom” bill. This bill would give federal
judges the option of allowing cameras in the courtrooms and
would promote greater public access to the courtrooms, thus
“ensur[ing] the sun shines in on the federal courts.”34 A particularly helpful feature of this bill is that it offers guidelines for
judges to refer to in deciding whether to permit video camera
access in their court.35 It also instructs the Judicial Conference,
the policymaking branch of the federal courts, to “issue mandatory guidelines for obscuring vulnerable witnesses such as
undercover officers, victims of crime, and their families.”36 Yet
even if this bill becomes law, the mandate would not be permanent; the “Sunshine Bill” includes a sunset clause calling for
its automatic expiration after three years.37 As of April 2010,
the bill was still awaiting consideration by the full U.S. Senate
and had yet to take effect.38 While this bill is a step in the right
direction, as it does not require a judge in federal court to allow
camera access during judicial proceedings, this step could also
be largely illusory. Since a judge has wide discretion in this
matter, it is unnecessary for him or her to specify a reason for
prohibiting camera access; this is truly a matter of the judge’s
personal preference. However, forty-eight states currently allow
for some method of audio-visual coverage in their courtrooms,
and almost forty states directly televise trials.39 Grassley has
stated that studies conducted in many of the states that televise
trials confirm that televised trial coverage educates the public
about the courts and does not interfere with proceedings.40
If the “Sunshine Bill” becomes law, it may look similar to
California Rule 1.150, which permits the judge to allow television, radio, and photographic coverage in the courtroom.41 In
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deciding whether to allow camera coverage, the California Rule
1.150 lists nineteen different factors for judges to consider.42
These factors include the type of case, whether the parties support the request, the degree of difficulty in selecting a jury, and
the effect on any minor who is a party, witness, or victim.43
Under the rule, the judge must prohibit media coverage of the
following: “(1) Proceedings held in chambers; (2) Proceedings
closed to the public; (3) Jury selection; (4) Jurors or spectators;
or (5) Conferences between an attorney and a client, witness,
or aide; between attorneys; or between counsel and the judge
at the bench.”44
Perhaps the most troubling of all courtroom camera restrictions is that to this day the Supreme
Court still does not allow camera
access in its courtroom. Greta Van
Susteren,45 who appeared regularly
on television as a legal analyst during the O.J. Simpson trial, called
the lack of camera coverage in the
Supreme Court “dangerous.”46 She
was especially frustrated that the
Supreme Court determines critical
issues but also operates without the
public’s scrutiny; “[s]ome people
get really mad about taxes or traffic or food additives . . . But there
is nothing that gets my blood boiling more than the fact that there is
a group of people in this country
whose decisions affect our lives and
who get to do their work in secret.”47 To better examine this
issue, it may be helpful to consider the Supreme Court’s analysis in cases that have strong arguments both for and against
media access to trials.

Court ruled that coverage of an already sensational trial created
too great a risk of influencing or distracting the judge, jurors,
witnesses, and lawyers.52 Furthermore, the Court said that the
presence of a camera, which it called a “powerful weapon,” deliberately damaged the defendant and subjected him to “a form
of mental—if not physical—harassment, resembling a police
line-up or the third degree.”53 The magnification of the defendant’s movements further intensify the trial and “transgress his
personal sensibilities, his dignity, and his ability to concentrate
on the proceedings before him—sometimes the difference between life and death . . . .”54
The Estes case was decided in 1965, at a time when cameras
were quite large and when “twelve
cameramen jostled for position, and
bright lights and a tangle of wires
and equipment turned the courtroom
into a broadcast studio.”55 This activity disrupted court proceedings.
Yet the dissents in Estes are as
noteworthy as the majority opinion
on this note. Justice William Brennan said that the decision “is not a
blanket constitutional prohibition
against the televising of state criminal trials,” but a prohibition against
televising the most sensational
ones, where the defendant is most
susceptible to the community’s interest and hence judgment.56 Justice
Potter Stewart followed by stating
that if the proceeding itself did not deprive the defendant of his
right to a fair trial, “then the fact that the public could view the
proceeding on television has no constitutional significance.”57
This argument means that an image, duplicated via a camera’s
broadcasts, did not automatically establish a constitutional violation. Instead, “[t]he Constitution does not make us arbiters
of the image that a televised state criminal trial projects to the
public.”58
Almost twenty years after Estes, the Supreme Court tackled another noteworthy case involving cameras in the courts. In
Chandler v. Florida, the Court ruled that televising a criminal
trial over the defendant’s objection did not automatically render
the trial unfair.59 Before the case reached the Supreme Court,
two Florida policemen were convicted of several crimes including burglary. At the time Florida was running a pilot program
where the courts allowed camera coverage in the courtroom, and
the case went to trial during this time.60 Since the defendants had
objected to televising the trial, the judge allowed taping only
of the closing arguments and a segment of the prosecution’s
presentation.61 The Chandler decision did not directly establish
that there is a constitutional right to have cameras in the courts.

Perhaps the most troubling
of all courtroom camera
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III. CAMERA SHY: LESSONS FROM CASE LAW
INVOLVING CAMERAS IN THE COURT
The Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas recognized the influence of courtroom cameras by holding that the use of such cameras may distort a criminal trial to such an extent that the only
remedy is a reversal of the defendant’s conviction.48 Defendant,
Billy Sol Estes, was accused of swindling after essentially duping farmers into buying farm equipment that never existed.49
His pretrial hearing to determine whether to admit television
cameras was covered live on television and radio.50 The Court
said that the use of television cameras deprived a defendant of
due process as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment, even if it
did not provoke specific prejudice against the accused.51 In addition to encouraging public condemnation of the accused, the
14
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Yet the case is significant because although the court denied
the defendants’ request not to televise the trial, the Supreme
Court still upheld the defendants’ burglary conviction.62 For a
court to decide that camera coverage led to prejudice against a
defendant, the defendant had to show that the media’s coverage compromised the jury’s ability to decide the case fairly.63
The defendants could not meet that burden with any identifiable
evidence in this case.
The Supreme Court Justices relied in part on the changes
in technology following Estes; television coverage was no longer a burdensome physical imposition, as large cameras, bright
lights, and heavy cables were a thing of the past. Moreover,
during jury selection each juror said that they would be “fair and
impartial despite the presence of a television [news] camera in
the courtroom.”64 Further, “[t]he risk of juror prejudice in some
cases does not justify an absolute ban on news coverage of trials by the printed media; so such also the risk of such prejudice
does not warrant an absolute constitutional ban on all broadcast
coverage.”65 Instead of directly overturning the previous ruling,
the Supreme Court said it was reading Estes more narrowly, so
that the holding would only apply to cases of widespread interest.66 Many states interpreted Chandler as an implicit message
of support for televising trials.67

A. TRIAL PUBLICITY AND AN IMPARTIAL JURY
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, the Supreme Court discussed the
circumstances in which media coverage would be so pervasive
as to damage a defendant’s due process rights, such that public
access to proceedings should be limited.68 Due process requires
that one accused of a crime be judged by an “impartial jury”
that is not affected by any “outside influences.”69 This case attracted much publicity because it involved a doctor who was
charged with murdering his pregnant wife, and was described
as a case involving “murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense.”70 Numerous newspaper articles were published convicting Sheppard in the court of public opinion; “The newspapers
portrayed Sheppard as a Lothario, fully explored his relationship with Susan Hayes, and named a number of other women
who were allegedly involved with him. The testimony at trial
never showed that Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides
the one with Susan Hayes.”71 Based on the “carnival”72 atmosphere that ensued inside the courtroom, the Court overturned
Sheppard’s conviction and remanded for retrial.
The Court outlined several steps that trial courts could use
to provide a fair trial in a highly publicized case. For example,
it was suggested that the judge tell all police, witnesses, and attorneys not to disclose information to the media that jurors are
not allowed to discover.73 Much of the information released was
inaccurate and confusing, and affected the jurors’ perception of
the defendant. Specifically, the prosecutors shared information
with the media that they were not allowed to present at trial.74
Criminal Law Brief

In doing so, they circumvented the rules of evidence, which are
designed to enhance the reliability of information presented to
the jurors. The Supreme Court suggested that given the extensive pretrial publicity, the trial court should have been on notice
that the proceedings could go awry and should have considered
sequestering the jurors or moving the trial to an alternate location.75 Although the case did not specifically focus on television news coverage of trials, but rather the danger of excessive
media publicity, it did bolster those who were against cameras
in the court.76

B. EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS
So far, courts have not supported the idea that there is a
First Amendment right to televise a trial. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, there were several mistrials in a murder case.77 As a result, the defendant’s attorneys asked that the
trial be closed to the public and the media, and the prosecution
did not object.78 The trial judge closed the proceedings to the
public and the media, but two reporters from Richmond Newspapers, Inc. claimed that doing so violated the First and Sixth
Amendments.79 They argued that “[t]o work effectively, it is
important that society’s criminal process ‘satisfy the appearance of justice,’ . . . [which] can best be provided by allowing
people to observe such process.”80 The Supreme Court said that
in the enumerated constitutional guarantees, there are also “certain unarticulated rights” which are tools for exercising those
rights that are spelled out.81 The right to attend criminal trials,
the Court held, is not explicitly stated in the First Amendment
but was implicitly guaranteed.82 The Court held that the freedom
of speech clause of First Amendment not only protected the
right to speak, but also the right to ”receive information and
ideas.”83 The other First Amendment guarantee the Court discussed was the right of assembly, which is necessary for meeting the freedom of speech prong of the First Amendment. The
right of assembly is protected for a public place, such as a trial
court room, “where the people generally—and representatives
of the media—have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and
quality of what takes place.”84

C. INCRIMINATING INFORMATION
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, a trial judge
ordered reporters to refrain from publishing incriminating
information about the defendant, including accounts of his confession.85 Erwin Charles Simants was charged with killing six
people, the Henry Kellie family, in a rural Nebraska community.86 The court order was designed to protect the defendant
from the disclosure of information that could be extremely prejudicial.87 The Supreme Court invalidated this order, relying in
part on past case law that places a high burden on the party moving for a restraint of media coverage.88 Just as criminal or civil
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punishments of a newspaper’s publishing of a story “chills” free
speech, “prior restraint ‘freezes’ it at least for the time.”89 The
Court looked at several factors in analyzing the validity of these
restrictions—first, the pervasiveness of pretrial news coverage
because it can provide a preview of what actual trial coverage
will look like; second, whether less drastic measures could mitigate the publicity’s effects, so that a minimal level of camera
access could be allowed in a way that protects the defendant’s
rights; and third, to what degree an order that restricts the press
would be effective in directly minimizing any danger that a trial
poses when it receives a huge amount of trial publicity.90 The
Court accepted the trial judge’s finding that the pretrial publicity was intense and pervasive.91 However, the Court found no
basis for concluding that the less restrictive measure of allowing
camera access in the courtroom could not guarantee a fair trial.92
The Court also doubted that the restraining order itself would be
effective in guaranteeing a fair trial, noting that the order would
be difficult to police, that media beyond the court’s jurisdiction
might publish prejudicial information, and that rumors in the
small community would travel “swiftly by word of mouth.”93

IV. ANALYSIS: CANDID CAMERA: HOW TO RESOLVE
THE ISSUE OF TRIAL BY SOUNDBITE
“We are not part of a national entertainment network.”94
-Justice Anthony Kennedy
The Supreme Court has overruled its previous decisions on
a wide variety of cases, but there is one precedent that seems always to hold firm—no televising of its proceedings. Ironically,
even in cases where the Supreme Court rules that televising
trials in other courts is constitutionally permissible, the Court
has not allowed their proceedings in making those decisions to
be televised.95

A. DOWNSIDE TO CAMERAS IN THE COURTS
The concern with this issue is whether media coverage
could allow a jury pool to be contaminated by information that
would be inadmissible in the courtroom, thus allowing them to
decide against the defendant not on proper evidence, but rather
on prejudicial information reported by the press. For instance,
information inadmissible in court and substantially prejudicial to
the defendant includes legally irrelevant information about the
defendant’s life, such as if he was unfaithful to his spouse. Other
potentially prejudicial information includes reporting whether
the defendant has had previous criminal convictions, discussing a confession where there is a chance it was not obtained
by legal means and describing evidence that police obtained
during an illegal search. The risks of televising trials could also
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increase the potential of the viewers’ heightened condemnation
of the accused so that if the defendant were acquitted, he may
have difficulty integrating back into society. Moreover, there is
also the concern that the presence of television cameras could
intimidate witnesses thus making them less willing to testify.96
In responding to the argument that broadcasting judicial
proceedings would enhance the judicial system’s esteem in the
eyes of the public, Judge Ito stated that broadcasting Congressional hearings had not helped enhance Congress’s approval rating among viewers.97 Moreover, the Judge was concerned that
small portions of testimony might be taken out of context and
broadcasted for its dramatic flair.98 Several others shared this
concern. Supreme Court Justice Souter’s “over my dead body”
quote referenced the fact that while he was Associate Justice
of the New Hampshire Superior Court, the presence of a camera limited the questions he would ask because he was worried
about his statements being “taken out of context on the evening
news.”99 It is true that no judge wants to be second-guessed.
If the public can watch someone performing their job, there is
thus more of an opportunity for them to also critique it. But the
opposite is also true; even if the public generally disagrees with
a court’s decision, the public might accept the ruling as fair because they have heard the arguments of each side along the way.
In addition to “trial by sound bite,” Judge Ito was worried that
a televised trial would lead to “nervous witnesses” and “grandstanding lawyers.”100 He was further concerned that television
coverage would only pick out the “most salacious sound bites”
and would encourage lawyers to play to the camera and not to
justice.101 Other arguments include that which holds the televising of a trial would violate “decorum” and “intimidate witnesses
and jurors.”102
Further, there is the chance of “media overkill.”103 If television networks cover a trial and ratings are high, the media may
cover the story in too much detail, even when there is nothing
new to report. The endless supply of useless details about the
case could cause viewers to become bored with its minutiae
and tune out from courtroom coverage altogether. In the O.J.
Simpson case the media coverage was incessant, to the point
that one poll “showed 74% of Americans could identify Kato
Kaelin but only 25% knew who Vice President was.”104 If people rely on television news as their source of information, and
the networks are running coverage only of a case they know
will draw ratings, there is other valuable information that this
coverage is displacing. Arguably, it is not worth jeopardizing
the criminal procedure protections of the Sixth Amendment for
the First Amendment because the trials provide little societal
value. In fact, when the freedom of the press allows the media
to sensationalize a trial, people obsess about celebrity trials at
the expense of engaging other valuable news.
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B. BENEFITS TO HAVING A CAMERA IN THE
SUPREME COURT
In the Supreme Court, there are neither jurors nor witnesses. Yet in thousands of courts across the country, judges
are able to control the proceedings despite the presence of a
camera.105 Clara Tuma, a truTV news anchor, stated that while
initially cameras can be distracting to jurors, they quickly adjust
to the presence of the cameras:
What we find time and time again is that a camera is
a novelty for the first moment or so. Jurors look at it.
Attorneys want to know what it will show and if their
bald spot will show. Judges are frequently concerned
whether their nameplates are visible. Those are cosmetic things and you get over them. The participants
quickly get to the business at hand and that is the business of a trial. The camera becomes invisible and is
quickly forgotten by the participants.106
As a television reporter covering the courts, I had firsthand
experience delivering stories directly to the camera, which in
reality, is communicating with viewers. The jury is composed
of the same people who watch the news; i.e., members of the
general public. In televising trials, these same people, now as
jurors, are still making decisions
about the case and are present in the
courtroom anyway. The greater risk
of contaminating the jury is grandstanding, which may occur regardless of the presence of a camera.
In the O.J. Simpson case,
“given the public’s right to attend
court proceedings and the paucity
of seats in the courtroom—9 to 15
spots are set aside for the public—
television coverage represented the
only alternative to holding court
in the Los Angeles Coliseum.”107
In fact, “[o]ne study estimated that
U.S. industry lost more than $25 billion as workers turned away from
their jobs to follow the trial.” 108
Both sides also felt that allowing
cameras in the court would help
to legitimize the verdict. When Ito
ruled in favor of the television camera in court, his position was summarized as follows: “[R]ather than
encourage irresponsible reporting, cameras could both check
and correct it, and that in a case crucial to public faith in courts,
television was essential.”109

This issue came to the forefront during the 2000 presidential election. The Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore110 decided
whether to continue recounting the ballots in Florida, a decision which would potentially determine the next president of
the United States.111 C-SPAN Chairman Brian Lamb wrote to
Chief Justice William Rehnquist requesting to broadcast the
proceedings so that the public may have a greater acceptance
of the Supreme Court’s ruling.112 However, Rehnquist denied
his request, writing that “a majority of the Court remains of the
view that we should adhere to our present practice of allowing
public attendance and print media coverage of argument sessions, but not allow camera or audio coverage.”113 However,
the Court did allow the immediate release of an audiotape of the
Bush v. Gore argument, whereas could the release of such tapes
often took take several months.114 Justice Rehnquist’s statement
left open the possibility that some Justices may have been supportive of letting the cameras access the courtroom.115 Either
way, the Supreme Court has seats for only 300 people.116 Once
those spaces fill up, lawyers who are Supreme Court Bar members “can listen to arguments over a speaker system in a nearby
room.”117 As for anyone else who has an interest or stake in the
case, they are out of luck. Broadcast news reporters can enter
the courtroom, but in order to share the information with the
public, they must rely on their notes and personal recollection
of what happened, which is not the
case with actual recordings.118
While the Court did provide
an expedited transcript released on
the day of argument, the transcript
failed to identify which Justices
were asking the questions.119 Hence,
“[t]he court missed an opportunity
when it failed to allow the millions
following the case [outside the
courtroom] to be eyewitnesses to
history, instead of mere eavesdroppers.”120 True, the public does have a
constitutional right to attend a judicial proceeding, but in practice such
a right means very little when seating is limited and individuals do not
have secondary viewership if television cameras are not allowed.121 The
Supreme Court does a disservice to
the constitutional principles it seeks
to uphold if it places barriers of the
truthful reporting of matters of public concern. At this point, when so many media consumers rely
on television news for their source of information, merely releasing printed transcripts is not a reasonable alternative.
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At the Supreme Court level, there is no jury that needs to
be sequestered. Surely no one expects the Justices to close their
eyes and ears to nightly news reports. Given the Justices’ lifetime appointments, there is no reason for them to be concerned
about being closely scrutinized. Furthermore, jurors for lower
courts are told that observing a case firsthand and making a
personal determination of its facts is a civic duty and promotes
justice. However, if they would actually like to watch a case
unfold at the nation’s highest court, they would have to travel
to Washington, D.C. A case that is decided upon constitutional
principles is an opportunity to educate the public and galvanize
a vigorous public debate on issues of national importance.

V. PROPOSAL: “A TRIAL RUN” FOR PLACING A
TELEVISION NEWS CAMERA IN THE SUPREME COURT
The day may come when television will have become
so commonplace an affair in the daily life of the average person as to dissipate all reasonable likelihood
that its use in courtrooms may disparage the judicial
process.122
-Justice Harlan
That day has already arrived. Right now, the public gets
most of their knowledge about the legal system from celebrity
run-ins with the law, such as Paris Hilton or Winona Ryder,
or from several especially heinous crimes that garner media
attention, such as the trials for the Menendez Brothers and
Scott Peterson. Other sources of information about the court
include reality shows such as Judge Judy or television dramas
such as Boston Legal and Law and Order. Instead of continuing its courtroom ban on cameras and tape recorders, the Supreme Court should revise its policy, and the Court should be
required to allow press coverage in the form of radio and television broadcasts. Would the television coverage of the nation’s
highest court turn the proceedings into a television drama?
Television networks push the hardest to televise only the most
sensational trials that often have limited significance, so would
not allowing cameras in the courts merely elevate these less
important cases and give them dignity that they do not deserve?
The other two branches of government, the executive and
the legislative branches, both allow camera access; “[i]f you
wish, you can watch Congress in session, debating issues, on
C-Span. The President of the United States routinely gives
televised press conferences and answers questions.”123 These
branches do the public a great service when they allow for better transparency. Supreme Court Justice confirmation hearings
are televised. There appears to be no justification to forbid seeing the Justices at work. What justifies the Supreme Court from
blocking such transparency? If cameras were to be allowed in
18

the Supreme Court, then television news organizations could
pool, or share, their footage, so that only one camera would
need to be present. Not televising courtroom proceedings, some
argue, “is like locking the courtroom door.”124
The “Sunshine in the Courtroom” bill should become law
and be applied to the federal courts. In March 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee approved the bill, which would amend
Chapter 45 of Title 28 of the United States Code.125 But the
Supreme Court should go even further than required by the bill
and California Rule 1.150. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter
sponsored a Senate bill that would allow television coverage of
all Supreme Court open sessions, “as long as a majority vote of
justices allows it or unless they rule that it would constitute a
violation of due process rights of one or more parties.”126 It is
important to emphasize that the bill would not allow the Justices’ deliberations to be televised, just the oral arguments. As
much progress as this bill could make, it still would leave the
ultimate decision about whether to televise proceedings to the
Justices themselves. It builds in a safeguard to protect parties’
constitutional rights. This bill should be the model for the Supreme Court’s camera access policy. The Supreme Court, as a
governmental entity, should not be in the business of telling the
public what to watch. Of course, whether in state, federal, or
the nation’s highest court, there may be exceptional reasons not
to televise. An example where direct coverage would unduly
burden the judicial branch would be a rape case, especially one
involving a minor, because a victim especially may be discouraged to come forward. Also, coverage may be curtailed if there
is a concern that stating a victim’s name may place them in
harm’s way. In these cases, it would be legitimate to exclude
televised coverage of court proceedings. In certain cases, individual judges, or in the case of the Supreme Court, the aggregate
of Justices, should be given discretion to make individualized
decisions.127
As the Justices are appointed for life, they do not need to
be concerned with the public’s approval rating, and therefore
they should not be influenced by the public’s perception of their
work. The trick is to navigate between two competing interests;
an individual privacy interest would have to be weighed against
publishing information that is of public importance. Simply put,
“[t]here is a reason we do not hold trials in private and a reason
we open the courtroom doors and invite in the world. The reason is that justice shines brightest in the sunshine.”128 At minimum, a presumption should be created that cameras are allowed
in the Court. The burden of proof would fall upon the Court or
the parties of a case to show that the presence of cameras would
adversely affect the outcome.
There is some hope for progress in the movement in allowing cameras in the Supreme Court. Justice Sonia Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter, who was extremely vocal against having
Supreme Court proceedings televised. Justice Sotomayor was
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careful not to directly say she would favor camera access, but
during her confirmation hearings, she did state that she would
be open to a dialogue: “I have had positive experiences with
cameras when I have been asked to join experiments using cameras in the courtroom.”129 We live in an era of blogs, podcasts,
and TiVo. If the Court does not make some effort to coexist
with trials’ television coverage, it will leave the education of the
public about the court system to those who do. Writer Dahlia
Lithwick, who covers the Supreme Court for Slate Magazine,
posits that if the Justices want to maintain the Court’s prestige,
it is in their best interest to televise its proceedings.130 She argues that new technology, specifically the Internet, makes it so
easy for others to flood the web with satire and “updates” about
the Supreme Court that it must use the television airwaves to
reach out to the public and preserve its image.131
“People want to know what happens in the marble
temple: If they aren’t allowed in to watch the real
thing, they will enter via snarky anonymous blog. If
the high court doesn’t make at least some concessions
to the public, the American people will get to know
its justices and their jobs through parody and politics
alone.”132
In essence, not only would the public be missing out on the
important details of a case, but also people who consult sources
with incorrect information could be misinformed.

VI. CONCLUSION: “T.V. OR NOT T.V.?”133
THAT IS THE QUESTION
In the O.J. Simpson trial, the ubiquitous presence of the
television camera turned a criminal trial into a courtroom
drama. Given the pervasiveness of cable news outlets, local,
and national news shows, it seems that there is an opportunity to
indulge the public’s fascination with celebrity trials and to teach
some powerful lessons about crimes, civil wrongs, and how the
judicial system functions. Presently, most states allow television coverage of criminal and civil trials in superior courts. In
California, for example, California Rule 1.150 (formerly Rule
of Court 990) allows, but does not require, television, radio,
and photo coverage.134 Federal courts have experimented with
television coverage in certain courts but under very limited
circumstances.
So far, courts have rejected the argument that the First
Amendment gives the right to televise a trial. While legislators
may have the ability to encourage federal courts to open their
doors to the camera, they have not taken steps to do the same
at the Supreme Court level. It is a direct blow to democracy to
not allow the public to understand how the Justices interpret the
Constitution in light of a specific set of facts. Television news
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equipment is no longer disruptive and can preserve the decorum
of the nation’s highest court. Further, it can provide a window
to its functions.
If a main concern is truth during a trial, it is best to not
make it more difficult for those disseminating the facts, the reporters, to gather information. It behooves the public to allow
the mild intrusiveness of a camera for the increased possibility of transparency and accountability of the courtroom. The
public has more confidence in the judicial system when they
see its processes step by step. Televising courtroom proceedings also serves as a check in making sure the process ensures
justice, because seeing the actual trial is the most direct way to
see the judicial system function. It is a foolproof way to get the
story right because the information is disseminated is its purest
form—through the trial itself.
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